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Abstract: Understanding factors that influence the success of protected areas in curbing unsustainable
resource consumption is essential for determining best management strategies and allocating limited resources
to those projects most likely to succeed. I used a law-enforcement and monitoring game-theory model from
the political science literature to identify three key variables useful in predicting the success of a protected
area: costs of monitoring for rule breakers, benefits of catching a rule breaker, and probability of catching
a rule breaker if monitoring. Although assigning exact values for each of these variables was difficult, the
variables had a strong predictive capacity even when coded as coarse ordinal values. A model in which such
values were used correctly predicted the outcome of 88 of 116 protected areas sampled from the peer-reviewed
literature. The model identified a critical zone of common mismatch between protected-area circumstances
and management policies. In situations where the costs of monitoring were greater than the product of the
probability of catching a rule breaker and the benefit of doing so, conservation was unlikely to succeed.
Control of illegal use of protected resources was reported in only 8% of such cases, regardless of strategies to
motivate potential users to cooperate with conservation. My model does not prescribe a best management
policy for conserving natural resources; rather, it can be used as a tool to help predict whether a proposed
management policy will likely succeed in a given situation.
Keywords: community-based conservation, game theory, monitoring, national parks, protected areas, rule en-
forcement
Dilemas del Monitoreo de Áreas Protegidas: Una Herramienta Nueva para Evaluar el Éxito
Resumen: El entendimiento de los factores que influyen en el éxito de las áreas protegidas para controlar
el consumo no sustentable de los recursos es esencial para la determinación de las mejores estrategias de
manejo y asignar recursos limitados a los proyectos con mayor probabilidad de éxito. Utilicé un modelo de
aplicación de leyes y teoŕıa de juegos tomado de la literatura de ciencia poĺıtica para identificar tres variables
claves útiles para pronosticar el éxito de un área protegida: costos de monitoreo para infractores, beneficios
por la captura de un infractor y la probabilidad de atrapar a un infractor si hay monitoreo. Aunque la
asignación de valores exactos para cada una de esas variables fue dif́ıcil, las variables tenı́an una alta
capacidad pronosticadora aun cuando fueron codificadas con valores ordinales crudos. Un modelo en que se
usaron tales valores pronosticó correctamente el resultados de 88 de 116 áreas protegidas muestreadas en la
literatura. El modelo identificó una zona cŕıtica de incompatibilidad entre circunstancias del área protegida
y poĺıticas de manejo. En situaciones en que los costos de monitoreo fueron mayores que el producto de
la probabilidad de atrapar a un infractor y el beneficio de hacerlo, era poco probable que la conservación
tuviera éxito. El control del uso ilegal de recursos protegidos fue reportado en solo 8% de esos casos, no
obstante las estrategias para motivar a los usuarios potenciales a cooperar con la conservación. Mi modelo
no prescribe una poĺıtica de mejor manejo para la conservación de recursos naturales; sino más bien puede
ser utilizada como una herramienta para ayudar a pronosticar śı una poĺıtica de manejo propuesta tendrá
éxito en una situación determinada.
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Palabras Clave: aplicación de reglas, áreas protegidas, conservación basada en comunidades, monitoreo, par-
ques nacionales, teoŕıa de juegos
Introduction
It is increasingly clear that there is no panacea to solv-
ing conservation dilemmas (Ostrom & Nagendra 2006).
Although government and internationally managed pro-
tected areas have been successful in conserving natu-
ral resources in some cases (e.g., Bruner et al. 2001;
WWF 2004; Nagendra 2008) and local management insti-
tutions have demonstrated success in other cases (Hayes
& Ostrom 2005; Hayes 2006), both have failed to pro-
tect resources in many cases. Debates over the one right
strategy to conservation are futile because social systems
are complex (Agrawal & Gibson 2001), ecological sys-
tems are complex (Costanza & Ruth 2001), and human-
ecological systems are especially complex (Berkes et al.
2003; Berkes 2006). Why, then, should there be a sin-
gle blueprint for solving all of the world’s conservation
dilemmas?
Despite the growing body of literature on the diversity
and complexity of human-ecological systems, protected-
area managers and funding organizations still tend to fa-
vor extremely simplistic blueprints for conservation man-
agement. The problem is not likely lack of knowledge or
foresight regarding the complexity of conservation prob-
lems as much as an issue of advocacy and policy making
(Borgerhoff Mulder 2007). Writing about the complex-
ity of problems is much easier than addressing complex
problems; to address such problems, policy makers need
clearly defined strategies. Although there is increasing de-
mand for detailed conservation management plans (Hock-
ings 2003) and upfront cost analyses to avoid sinking re-
sources into hopeless projects (Naidoo et al. 2006), the
tools to help diagnose appropriate strategies under lim-
ited time and budgetary constraints are lacking (Ferraro
& Pattanayak 2006). Compared with tools for assessing
biological components, those for assessing social factors
affecting the success of protected areas are especially
scarce, despite the fact that it is the human impact on the
resources that typically determines the success or failure
of a protected area.
Models can be powerful tools with which policy mak-
ers can avoid exhausting resources on inappropriate
strategies. Yet models lose their practicality when they
are complex and when the initial investment required
is high. The handful of preliminary models available in
the current literature, although insightful and impressive,
would likely overwhelm a project manager trying to de-
cide the best immediate course of action. For example,
Agrawal and Chhatre (2006) identify over 30 variables
significant to conservation outcomes, Ostrom (2007) and
Brooks et al. (2006) add many questions to the manager’s
research agenda, and Chhatre and Agrawal (2008) high-
light the need to look at context and interaction effects.
Although all of these considerations are likely pertinent
for determining the ideal strategy for a specific situation,
the resources required to answer all questions may be
prohibitive.
Here, I present some relatively simple variables that
perform well in identifying the most common mis-
matches between protected-areas circumstances and
management strategies. Although by no means all inclu-
sive, these variables should be minimal requirements for
any precursory assessment or justification of a protected-
area management plan. I derived these variables from
work predominantly in the commons literature, but they
are applicable to all conservation strategies. I considered
only protected-area management, which I define as situ-
ations in which the state owns the resource in question
and manages it primarily from the top down. Such man-
agement can occur with varying degrees of community
involvement and compensation and is thus often pre-
sented in conservation literature as “community-based”
conservation. The key distinction between situations of
protected-area management, by my definition, and most
conservation situations presented in the commons litera-
ture is that the primary initiator and rule-making institu-
tion is the state (or a third party acting on behalf of the
state) rather than the user group itself.
Although I focused on management of protected ar-
eas, my goal was not to argue that protected areas are the
only way to conserve resources. Local rule-making insti-
tutions can be equally or more effective than top-down
management in many situations (Hayes & Ostrom 2005).
However, successful local institutions are generally self-
emergent and deep rooted (Stern et al. 2002). There are
many situations in which local institutions may not exist
or readily evolve at critical conservation moments and
in which top-down initiation might be the more plau-
sible strategy. It is much harder for a policy maker to
create a situation in which conservation attitudes and
rules emerge from the community itself than to impose
conservation rules from outside that nonetheless bene-
fit the community (and thus may eventually take root in
the community and evolve into local management). My
goal was not to prescribe a “best” management policy for
conserving natural resources, but rather to provide tools
to help predict whether a proposed management policy
will be likely to succeed in a given situation.
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Methods
Model of the Monitoring Dilemma
The key variables I used (Table 1) are drawn from a
game-theory model of monitoring and rule enforcement
presented in the political science literature as early as
1989 (Tsebelis 1989) that has since been represented in
various forms in the political science and commons litera-
ture (Holler 1991; Ostrom et al. 1994; Weissing & Ostrom
2000). This model can get quite complicated and lead to
surprising results at states of mixed equilibria; however,
the variables of interest were derived from the simplest
equilibrium points of the model. For this reason, only the
most basic foundations of the model are described here.
For a discussion of the model in more complex states,
see Weissing and Ostrom (2000). Understanding of the
full-fleshed model is essential for evaluating outcomes
of most common pool-management situations; however,
my results show that such understanding is less necessary
for predicting the outcome of most typical situations in
protected-area management.
The importance of law enforcement and monitoring
in the successful management of protected areas has
been underscored throughout the conservation literature
(Leader-Williams & Milner-Gulland 1993; Gibson et al.
2005; Dobson & Lynes 2008). Many empirical studies
have found monitoring and rule enforcement to be more
strongly correlated with resource condition than any
other variable, in both local management and top-down
management situations (e.g., Bruner et al. 2001; WWF
2004; Gibson et al. 2005). Given that effective monitoring
is clearly a good predictor of the success of a protected
Table 1. Variables relevant to monitoring dilemma model to predict




Bm benefit or value of resource to monitor 1 to 5
Bu benefit or value of resource to user 0 to 5
C cost of monitoring 1 to 5
P probability a monitor will catch an
illegal user
1 to 5
M income gained by monitor for catching
illegal user
0 to 3




Om monitoring outcome (does monitoring
occur?)
0 or 1
Ou user outcome (is illegal use effectively
reduced?)
0 or 1
aDetails of attribute levels are available (see Supporting Informa-
tion).
bNot relevant to the first or second node, thus not essential for this
study.
area, predicting whether managers will invest in effective
monitoring is critical.
As various versions of the monitoring game (Tsebelis
1989; Mesterton-Gibbons & Milner-Gulland 1998; Weiss-
ing & Ostrom 2000) demonstrate, not all situations are
conducive to effective monitoring. In fact, successful
monitoring is only expected to result from a very lim-
ited set of conditions. By deriving the set of conditions
that predict whether effective monitoring and rule en-
forcement is likely to occur, my model yields powerful
hypotheses regarding the predicted success of different
conservation situations.
The monitoring dilemma is set up as a game with
two players, resource users and managers, in which
each player has two options per turn. The resource user
must decide whether to abide by the law or to illegally
use a protected resource, and the manager must decide
whether or not to monitor for illegal activity. By dissect-
ing the game diagram (Fig. 1), I constructed a predictive
flow chart in which complexity in predicting the out-
come increases at each node (Fig. 2). By beginning with
Figure 1. The general conditions of the monitoring
dilemma as presented by Ostrom et al. (1994).
Situations are in order of easiest to most difficult to
predict (node 1, managers not monitoring, thus users
expected not to follow rules protecting the resource so
long as they derive benefits from using the resource;
node 2, users not following rules and probability of
catching a rule breaker times the benefit to the
monitor of doing so is less than the cost of monitoring,
thus monitors not expected to monitor; NE, Nash
equilibrium; variable definitions are provided in
Table 1).
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Figure 2. Flowchart for predicting the outcome of a monitoring dilemma game presented in Fig. 1, ordered from
easiest to most difficult to predict: node 1, benefit of using the resource ≤0 for the potential users, thus resource is
not exploited illegally regardless of the presence of monitors; node 2, users derive benefit from using the resource
and the probability of catching an illegal user times the benefit of doing so is less than the costs of monitoring,
thus monitors elect not to monitor and illegal use of the resource continues (gray circle, area of many mismatches
between protected-area circumstances and management strategies); node 3, monitors are monitoring, but
probability of being caught times the consequences is less than the benefits a user derives from exploiting the
resource, thus illegal use continues despite the presence of monitors; opposite of node 3 is true, mixed-strategy
equilibrium with reduced resource exploitation expected. Variables are defined in Table 1.
the simplest prediction (the first node) and working to-
ward the much more complex questions (the third node
and beyond), most protected-area policy mismatches can
be identified early on and with minimal investment of
resources.
Node 1: Is the Resource Disputed?
The first node identifies whether the management sit-
uation poses any dilemma between a user group and
the management agency. Dilemmas arise when the use
of a resource is disputed, which occurs only when the
user associates a positive benefit (Bu) with using the re-
source. Situations do occasionally appear in the literature
where the potential resource user associates no benefit,
or even associates a cost, with using the protected re-
source regardless of rules. In such cases Bu ≤ 0, and
one would expect to see cooperation with conservation
efforts because there is no reason not to cooperate. In
true resource dilemmas, however, Bu > 0 and resource
users are expected to continue using the resource unless
there are negative consequences for doing so. If there is
no monitoring to catch rule breakers, a user will choose
to use the protected resource regardless of laws (Fig. 1,
arrow for node 1 points down). The eventual degrada-
tion of the resource is obviously a negative consequence,
but factors external to the individual are necessary to en-
courage users to cooperate with rules instead of acting
to maximize only their own immediate gains.
Node 2: Is Monitoring Worthwhile from the Monitor’s
Perspective?
The most common strategy for overcoming degradation
of resources due to collective action dilemmas is to cre-
ate rules and negative consequences for breaking those
rules. Because consequences are not possible without
enforcement and enforcement is not possible without
monitoring, rules require monitors. The addition of rules
adds this new player, the monitor, to the game. One must
first overcome the monitoring dilemma before the origi-
nal dilemma can be resolved.
The first part of the monitoring matrix is given. Because
there is always a cost (C) involved with monitoring, man-
agers would prefer not to monitor if they expect potential
resource users to abide by their rules anyway (Fig. 1, top
arrow points right). Resource users will use the resource
regardless of rules if they expect no monitoring to occur,
and monitors will not monitor if they expect users to not
use the resource anyway. Because both parties are aware
of this situation, the more insightful questions are what
are monitors expected to do when they expect users will
illegally use the protected resource and what are resource
users expected to do when they expect monitoring to oc-
cur. These questions, represented by the remaining two
sides of the monitoring dilemma matrix (Fig. 1), shape
the likelihood of successful management interventions.
The first question, regarding the monitor’s actions,
encompasses node 2 (Fig. 2) because it requires fewer
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variables than the second question to predict. If managers
do not monitor while users continue to use the resource,
they suffer losses (–Bm) equivalent to the lost resource.
If managers do monitor and catch a user not abiding by
the rules, managers gain both the corresponding bene-
fits of the resource in the form consumed by the user
(Bu) and any additional revenues (M) from fines imposed
on the offender. It is not always the case, however, that
the monitors will catch offenders. The probability (P) of
catching rule breakers must be taken into consideration.
The resulting equation for calculating the expected pay-
off of monitoring is P(M – C) – (1 – P)(–B – C) (Fig. 1).
When this is greater than –Bm, the expected payoff of not
monitoring, managers will choose to monitor. Although
fairly intuitive, the reduced form of this equation, P(M +
Bm) > C, reveals much about the management strategy
for protected areas. Only if the probability of catching a
rule breaker times the benefit of doing so is greater than
the cost of monitoring will managers elect to monitor,
even if they suspect their rules are not being followed
(Fig. 1, arrow for node 2 points left).
Monitors’ interests are oversimplified here. In reality,
individual monitors are rarely rewarded the entire fine
imposed on the offender, and they usually do not bene-
fit entirely from Bu (especially if they effectively preempt
extraction of the resource). Although the benefits of mon-
itoring are spread across the entire community or manag-
ing agency, monitors bear the full costs individually. An
extensive literature is devoted to such second-order col-
lective action dilemmas (Oliver 1980) and the factors that
help or hinder groups in overcoming them (Boyd & Rich-
erson 1992; Agrawal & Goyal 2001; Kiyonari & Barclay
2008). Fine-tuning of the model requires consideration of
such second-order factors; however, measuring them can
be difficult. Because M, Bu, and Bm are assigned coarse
ordinal values in my model, they can be considered prox-
ies for the relative proportion of the benefits the monitor
receives and can thus carry valuable information without
requiring precise data.
Node 3: Is Using the Resource Worthwhile from the User’s
Perspective?
As with higher-order dilemmas, the third node (Fig. 2, left
side of Fig. 1) involves a complex set of variables. This
node regards the user’s actions when she or he expects
the monitor to be monitoring (in other words, when P[M
+ Bm] > C; arrow in Fig. 1, node 2 points left). The
model is taken to completion in Weissing and Ostrom
(2000) and predicts that the resource user will use the
resource illegally even when she or he expects monitor-
ing to occur if the benefit to the user, Bu , is greater than
the probability of getting caught times the sum of Bu and
the expected punishment (F) (Fig. 1, node 3 arrow would
point down). If the opposite is true (node 3 arrow points
up), there is a mixed strategy equilibrium with some mon-
itoring and reduction, but not elimination, of illegal use
of the resource. Understanding the nuances of this con-
dition is useful for making predictions at the third node
and is the subject of much discussion in the commons lit-
erature. This state is not elaborated upon here, however,
because it involves complex variables that are difficult to
assess in the field. In contrast, the variables of the sec-
ond node are relatively easy to predict and may yield the
greatest insight into typical protected-area-management
mismatches.
Typical Strategies for Overcoming Conservation Dilemmas
There is ongoing debate in the conservation literature
regarding whether increasing the benefits of conserva-
tion to the local community or increasing punishment for
rule breaking is the most effective tactic for protected-
area management. My monitoring model suggests that
neither tactic is effective in most typical protected-area
situations. In most situations, the variables driving the
monitor’s decision are those that determine the outcome
because the resource users make their decision according
to what they think the monitors will do.
By my definition protected-area management imple-
ments a top-down approach, where a third-party entity
detached from the user community establishes rules and
takes responsibility for enforcing those rules. In cases
where local communities continue to use the resource in
a protected area despite the rules, protected-area man-
agers typically resort to one of the following general
strategies: create more disincentives for rule breaking
by establishing even harsher rules (stick); provide more
benefits to the user community to create incentives for
cooperation with laws (carrot); or devolve monitoring
responsibilities (and costs) to the user community (pass
the buck).
If the failure of the initial strategy occurs on the moni-
tor’s side of the model, however, stick and carrot strate-
gies will likely have no influence on the conservation
outcome because these strategies act on the incentives
of the resource user and not those of the monitor. A strat-
egy devised to overcome failure at node 2 of a protected-
area situation can only result in better protection of the
resource if it acts on one of the variables C, P, M, or Bm,
sufficiently enough to reverse the equation P(M + Bm) <
C. Although incentives and disincentives can significantly
affect variables on the user’s side, such as F, this variable
is not relevant until node 3. If the case fails at node 2 (the
monitor is not expected to monitor) the resource user is
not expected to change his or her behavior because there
is no increase in actual risk if there is no monitoring.
Devolving monitoring costs to the user community
(pass the buck) can be an effective strategy with which
to overcome a second-node failure because this change
acts directly on variables on the monitoring side. The
probability of catching rule breakers can be maximized
Conservation Biology
Volume 23, No. 5, 2009
Walker 1299
while minimizing costs of monitoring if people can mon-
itor while going about their normal routines. Again, this
strategy is predicted to work only if it results in a reversal
of the equation P(M + Bm) < C, so that monitors would
be expected to monitor. Cases in which monitoring re-
sponsibilities and rule-making responsibilities (including
choice of whether to protect the resource at all) are ef-
fectively transferred to the user community do not fall
within my definition of protected-area management situ-
ations and are thus outside the scope of this analysis.
Summary of Model Predictions
Based on the monitoring dilemma model described
above, I generated a series of predictions regarding the
potential success of a given protection strategy under
different circumstances. A flowchart depiction of these
model predictions is presented in Fig. 2 and the variables
are summarized in Table 1. The nodes are defined as fol-
lows:
• Node 1, if the benefit of using the resource is zero or
less (Bu ≤ 0), the user is expected to cooperate with
rules.
• Node 2, if the probability of catching a rule breaker
times the benefit of doing so is less than the cost of
monitoring, P(M + Bm) < C, monitors are not expected
to monitor and users will continue to illegally use the
resource.
• Node 3, if the probability of catching a rule breaker
times the benefit of doing so is greater than the cost
of monitoring, P(M + Bm) > C, mixed results are ex-
pected that will significantly differ from those of nodes
1 and 2. More successful outcomes are expected here
compared with node 2, but specific results depend on
factors beyond this model.
The above hypotheses should hold true regardless of
the strategy used (neutral top-down monitoring, top-
down monitoring with carrot, top-down monitoring with
stick, pass the buck). However, a pass-the-buck strategy
is more likely to result in a situation in which P(M + Bm)
> C.
Applying the Model to Protected-Area Cases
Assigning precise values to variables P, M, Bm, and C is
difficult, even for a manager who is very familiar with the
situation of a given protected area. To simplify the task, I
developed an ordinal ranking scheme for assigning each
of the variables a value of 1–5 based on basic observa-
tions of the protected area and the nature of the resource
type and restriction in question (see Supporting Informa-
tion). Because the use of ordinal numbers compromises
the integrity of the original mathematical model (one can-
not assume that one unit of B equals one unit of C, for
example), I rebalanced the model by adding weighting
coefficients to each variable and optimizing them with a
training set of 50 cases from current peer-reviewed litera-
ture. I used an additional 66 cases to validate the resulting
model.
I selected model training and validation cases by
searching the ISI Web of Knowledge for combinations
of key phrases: community∗, natural resource manage-
ment, conservation, protected area∗, reserve∗, and na-
tional park∗. The definition of protected area was ex-
tended to apply to both geographical entities (areas of
land or water) and conceptual entities (e.g., wildlife or
fish). Cases regarding situations in which communities
have initiated and historically managed their own con-
servation efforts were not reviewed because such situ-
ations commonly differ in many ways from the typical
protected-area management cases for which this model
was proposed. If pertinent information regarding one or
more of the variables in Table 1 was missing, I performed
another search on the protected area in question and
examined up to five of the most recent peer-reviewed
manuscripts to fill in the gaps. I also used some non-
peer-reviewed sources (World Center for Monitoring of
Conservation, ParksWatch, United Nations Educational,
Scientific & Cultural Organization [UNESCO]) to inform
background details such as park area and number of en-
forcement personnel. Cases and data sources are available
(see Supporting Information).
I coded outcome as a binary variable (“substantial il-
legal use” or “general cooperation with rules”) despite
the fact that some level of illegal resource use almost
always persists. Even if a minimum level of illegal use
was reported, I considered resource protection success-
ful if authors reported significant reduction in resource
use from preprotection levels or greater abundance or
quality compared with nearby, comparable, unprotected
resources.
The model was optimized with evolutionary search
methods to determine the set of weighting coefficients
that best minimized the squared error between the train-
ing set observations and the model predictions. I used
Frontline Systems Premium Solver 8.0 in Microsoft Excel
to perform the evolutionary searches. I ran 50 initial pa-
rameter configurations 5 times each at 1000 iterations and
selected the top 25 models as candidates for testing with
the validation set. The variance in the results between
candidate models was calculated to gauge the sensitivity
of the model to different weighting configurations.
Results
The literature sampling resulted in 116 cases from 35
countries spanning all continents except Antarctica. Co-
operation with the conservation rule was reported in 46%
of cases, whereas substantial illegal use of the resource
was reported in 54% of cases (Fig. 3).
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Figure 3. Performance of the
monitoring model in predicting
case-study outcomes: black boxes,
substantial illegal use of the
protected resource; white boxes,
general cooperation with
protection rules; black and white
boxes, mixed predictions;
numbers correspond to the
number of literature cases
reviewed with outcomes falling
under each category. Gray
rectangle highlights node 2,
where most management
mismatches occur. Letter
variables are defined in Table 1.
The best-fit model for the training set was 0.93P∗(4.6M
+ 3.1B)/3.6C, and its error was 0.24. Surprisingly, the de-
fault model, 1P∗(1M + 1B)/1C performed almost equally
well (error of 0.26) and outperformed the best-fit model
on the validation set (errors of 0.24 and 0.25, respec-
tively). For the sake of creating a user-friendly tool, I
retained the simpler default model as the final model. All
results reported here thus apply to the model in which
P, M, B, and C each has a weight of one.
Overall, the model prediction and the reported out-
come matched for 76% of cases. The predictive capacity
of the model was much stronger for some combinations
of management strategy and variables than others (Fig. 3).
The model proved a strong predictor for category A, cor-
responding to node one, where its prediction of coopera-
tion with conservation rules was accurate for all 7 cases.
Under top-down management, in which monitoring is
entirely the responsibility of someone outside the user
community, the model also showed strong predictive ca-
pacity when P(M + Bm) < C (categories C, D, and E), but
weak predictive capacity when P(M + Bm) > C (category
B). Cooperation with conservation rules was evident in
only 3 (8%) of the 37 cases in which P(M + Bm) < C, but
was evident in 20 (62%) of the 32 cases in which P(M +
Bm) > C.
Under decentralized monitoring, in which some level
of monitoring responsibility is passed down to the user
community, the model proved a weak predictor when
P(M + Bm) < C (category F), but was a strong predictor
when P(M + Bm) > C (category G). Benefits of moni-
toring were estimated to outweigh costs for 32 (44%) of
the 72 cases involving top-down monitoring, compared
with 18 (49%) of the 37 cases involving pass-the-buck
strategies.
Categorization of cases, and thus predicted outcomes,
did show some sensitivity to choice between the different
weighting schemes of the 25 best-fit models. As the bal-
ance of P(M + Bm) relative to C changed, some cases in
categories C, D, and E switched to category B (depend-
ing on whether the management strategy was neutral,
carrot, or stick, respectively) and vice versa, and cases in
category F switched to G and vice versa (Fig. 4). Cases in
category A did not change because they were determined
by the single variable Bu. Despite this sensitivity to model
choice, the difference in outcomes remained significant
for all categories except F regardless of the best-fit candi-
date model chosen (Student’s t test, p = 0.95 for category
F, p < 0.01 for all others).
Figure 4. Number of protected-area cases from the
literature falling into each of the seven categories of
the monitoring dilemma model (MS, general
management strategy; categories A-G in Fig. 2; light
gray, successful cases; dark gray, unsuccessful cases;
error bars, SD in case placement between the 25
best-fit models).
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Discussion
The results of the monitoring model applied to case
studies in the literature highlight a critical area of mis-
match between typical protected-area circumstances and
management strategies. Top-down protected-area man-
agement and monitoring most often results in a scenario
in which the costs of monitoring for rule breakers out-
weigh the probability of catching a rule breaker multi-
plied by the benefits of doing so. When this is the case,
monitoring is generally sporadic at best, and illegal re-
source use is usually common. To curb this illegal use,
managers often turn to carrot or stick strategies to con-
vince potential users to cooperate with rules by raising
incentives for cooperation or increasing punishment for
rule breaking. However, when the failure occurs at node
2 (the monitor’s side of the game), these strategies will
have little effect in curbing resource use because illegal
users do not expect to get caught. That 92% of reviewed
cases failing at node 2 were not successful in curbing il-
legal resource use regardless of whether neutral, carrot,
or stick strategies were applied (Fig. 3, categories C, D,
and E) should alert managers to the mismatch in such
strategies.
Although my results demonstrate that carrot strategies
of increasing benefits of conservation are not effective
in curtailing illegal resource use in the short term, this
is not to say there is no benefit in such strategies. Local
communities often bear the brunt of the costs of conser-
vation and deserve to gain something in return for moral
reasons if nothing else. For effective conservation, car-
rot strategies could be most successful if involving the
user community in conservation efforts is seen as a long-
term investment, with the ultimate goal of turning over
conservation management and responsibilities entirely to
the community (i.e., pass the buck and eventually com-
plete devolution). Such devolution can greatly reduce
management costs, potentially reversing the balance of
monitoring costs to benefits to favor true monitoring. In
this study, pass-the-buck strategies showed only slightly
greater tendency to result in situations favoring monitor-
ing (where P[M + Bm] > C) than top-down strategies
(44% and 49% of cases, respectively). Projects initiated
by the community, however, were excluded from the
sample, and inclusion of such projects might result in a
greater difference.
The weakest predictive area of this model was when
P(M + Bm) > C (Fig. 3, category B). The mixed results
within this category are expected because it occurs at the
third node, involving factors beyond those of this study
and whose dynamics often yield situations of mixed-state
equilibria. It is also possible that prediction capacity of
this category is weakened by erroneous placement of
some cases due to over- or underestimation of one or
more of the variables such that the balance between
P(M + Bm) and C is altered. Here, M and Bm are especially
susceptible to overestimation due to the assumption of
a linear relationship between the monitor’s benefits and
the total value of the resource. In reality, an agency may
receive a high Bm payoff from tourism or carbon credits,
for example, or a large M payoff by confiscating valu-
able assets, but may not share much of the benefits with
individual monitors. Monitors who do not receive the
benefits personally have little incentive to monitor re-
gardless of the total value to the agency. Alternatively,
monitors may receive high benefits from bribes, giving
them incentive to allow illegal use to continue. To better
predict outcome in this category, more information on
monitor accountability and incentive schemes would be
useful. Unfortunately, such data are rarely presented in
the literature and thus could not be examined here.
As with the top-down strategy in which P(M + Bm) >
C (Fig. 3, category B), a pass-the-buck strategy in which
P(M + Bm) > C (Fig. 3, category G) was expected to pro-
duce mixed results. However, illegal resource use was
reported in noticeably fewer cases for the pass-the-buck
strategy (22% for category G vs. 38% for category B). Like-
wise, although a pass-the-buck strategy in which P(M +
Bm) < C (Fig. 3, category F) was expected to be as in-
effective as a top-down strategy with the same unfavor-
able cost–benefit balance (Fig. 3, categories C, D, and
E), 47% of cases reported success in reducing illegal re-
source use in category F, compared with a mere 8% of
cases in categories C, D, and E. The higher success of
pass-the-buck cases may reflect incentives not well ac-
counted for in this model, such as social currencies. For
such cases involving community-based monitoring, even
at the incomplete level of devolution considered in this
model, the more intricate community-level monitoring
models of Mesterton-Gibbons and Milner-Gulland (1998)
and common-management variables such as those iden-
tified by Agrawal and Chhatre (2006) may yield more
insight.
Although it is plausible that important variables were
overlooked, it is also possible that authors writing about
community-based monitoring have a greater tendency to
publish successful cases than those writing about top-
down management. Published literature provides an in-
herently biased representation of real-world practices,
and caution should be taken in using this medium to
gauge the frequency of different management strategies.
Such case studies are more useful in providing insight into
the effectiveness of a particular strategy than comparing
results between strategies. Even then, different authors
likely perceive and report situations differently, toning
down aspects that others might exaggerate or vice versa.
Assigning specific values to such written information in-
volves some degree of subjectivity. Due to variance in au-
thor perception, writing style and coder interpretation,
it is unlikely that a perfectly predictive model could be
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constructed based on published literature alone. Given
such subjectivity, the predictive capacity of this model in
categories C, D, and E is striking.
This model demonstrates that a majority of the failed
cases presented in the current conservation literature
can be explained by the monitoring-side predictions of
the monitoring dilemma. Managers of protected areas,
especially those monitored from the top-down, would
greatly benefit from incorporating this tool into current
management-plan assessments and evaluation protocols
to determine the likely success of current or proposed
management strategies.
Protected areas are increasingly expensive to monitor
and enforce (Hayes & Ostrom 2005). Although manage-
ment costs are increasing, international financing of pro-
tected areas appears to have reached a plateau (Molnar
et al. 2004). Mean expenditure for protected areas in
developing countries is estimated between $93 and
$157/km2, whereas estimates for effective management
indicate that at least $277 is needed for each square kilo-
meter protected in developing countries (James et al.
2001). With such limited funds and so much area wor-
thy of protection, it is critical to assess the potential of
a given management strategy to succeed before invest-
ing too much money in that strategy. This tool can help
managers inexpensively identify the most prominent mis-
matches. The saved resources could be invested into
project evaluation so as to provide feedback for future
tuning of this tool.
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